The administration of US President Joe Biden has made no secret of its desire to free the United States from the Middle East. Secretary of State Anthony Brinken said in an interview before taking office that he envisioned Biden as president would be "less but not more" in the region. A senior US official also told me that the Obama administration did not implement its so-called Asian turn, but "we did it this time."
The "strategic competition" between the United States and China currently dominates discussions on American foreign policy and represents the consensus of the two parties in Washington. But despite all the discussions about the withdrawal of troops from the Middle East and the real regional anxiety about the US abandoning after Afghanistan, local reality suggests otherwise: Washington still maintains a large network of military bases and has proven willing to accept even the largest to strengthen An annoying partner in the name of regional security. More importantly, regional dynamics may lead to further instability and violence—thus driving demand for the continued existence of the United States.
To be sure, the United States is no longer the only global player in the Middle East. Over the past decade, China’s economic and technological investment and Russia’s military influence have grown. In this sense, the American era is over. However, although the Americans may wish to end with the Middle East, the Middle East did not end with the United States. The withdrawal of US troops is not only a myth, but it is preventing important debates in Washington on how the United States can adjust its policies to improve the lives of citizens in the region and contribute to a more just political order in the Middle East.
Although the capitals of Arab countries fear that US commitments to the Middle East will decline, US military involvement has shown greater continuity than generally accepted. Despite promises to review the US$23 billion in arms sales to the United Arab Emirates and pay more attention to human rights, the Biden administration decided to continue the arms sales. The “recalibration” of Biden’s relationship with Saudi Arabia did not lead to major policy changes: Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman, brother of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and Senior U.S. officials held high-level talks. Although the U.S. released an intelligence report assessing the crown prince, it still approved the arrest and killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. National Security Adviser Jack Sullivan also met directly with the Crown Prince in Riyadh in September 2021. The government subsequently promoted a new US$650 million arms sales to Saudi Arabia.
This does not look like the government has turned away from traditional US partners or "placed human rights at the center of its foreign policy." This model surpassed the wealthy partners of the United States in the Gulf region: Although the Biden team chose to temporarily withhold US$130 million in military aid to Egypt, its decision did not meet the expectations of human rights organizations that the government would support Congressional legislation for US$300 million. Military assistance for the conditions to make concrete progress in the rule of law and reform measures. Although President Abdul Fatah Al-Sisi suppressed political opposition and civil society, Egypt receives US$1.3 billion in aid each year through the US Foreign Military Financing Program, and remains one of the top three recipients of US military aid in the world. .
The Biden administration did readjust its military posture by announcing the reduction of its anti-missile system in the region, because it refocused on the challenges posed by Russia and China. In September, although the Houthis continued to launch missile attacks from Yemen into Saudi territory, the withdrawal of these systems from Saudi Arabia in September enhanced the feeling that Riyadh was abandoned by the United States. The Department of Defense is also currently conducting an important global force posture assessment, which may affect the US military footprint in the Middle East, because the US prioritizes threats in the Indo-Pacific region. But it is doubtful whether the tens of thousands of US troops will be cut sharply — or whether Washington is prepared to ignore the security needs of its major regional partners.
The strategic reason for reducing the US presence in the Middle East is simple. In addition to considering the ever-changing geo-strategic conditions that require the transfer of resources to Asia, the United States' dependence on Middle East oil has also been significantly reduced. Whether large-scale bases can effectively perform counter-terrorism missions and whether these bases will provoke further Iranian attacks rather than deter them has also been subject to increasing scrutiny. Some analysts believe that the United States should bring all its troops home, while other analysts believe that smaller bases can be used to form a more dispersed regional situation. This will enable the United States to reduce its dependence on large operational bases such as Udeid Air Force Base in Qatar or Camp Alifjan in Kuwait. With the improvement of Tehran's missile and drone strike capabilities, these bases may be more vulnerable to Iranian attacks.
These arguments are convincing. But political considerations, bureaucratic inertia, the continued vulnerability of the United States to global oil market shocks, and the economic interests of the US defense industry make a rapid reversal unlikely—regardless of the strategic logic. The U.S. Gulf partners want the U.S. military to stay, seeing these bases as a sign of Washington’s political commitment to their security. After the United States withdrew from Afghanistan, Qatar and other Gulf countries played such an important role in the airlift of Afghans, is it possible for the Biden administration to shut down Udeid? Downsizing may be possible, but complete closure is an extension.
The Middle East has nothing to do with the United States.
The continued attention of the two parties to Iran will also contribute to the massive military presence of the United States. Joint maritime security exercises aimed at containing Iran now include the United States, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. It is unclear whether large US bases are as vulnerable to Iranian attacks as some people fear: Qatar and Kuwait, two countries with thousands of American personnel, maintain friendly relations with Tehran, and may not be. Iran is as vulnerable to attacks by Iran against its own troops. nation. Therefore, the political costs of alienating Gulf partners may offset the benefits of reducing the U.S. presence in the region.
The withdrawal of missile defense systems and aircraft carriers from the Middle East is a sign that the United States has reduced its presence in the region, and this situation may become more frequent as resources shift to Asia. Regional partners will not like this, but they will learn to accept it. But shutting down large-scale military infrastructure is another matter entirely.
Iran believes that the continued U.S. military presence in the region is both a threat to its interests and a convenient target. As Tehran seeks to strengthen its deterrence, it may be more willing to strike a small number of US troops in conflict areas than large US military bases in the Gulf. US and Israeli officials accused Iran of launching a drone attack on the al-Tanf US base in Syria in October, possibly in retaliation for Israeli air strikes in Syria. The US military presence in Iraq has also been reduced to only a few thousand, and these troops are still vulnerable to attacks by Iran-backed militias.
The hostility between the United States and Iran is now deeply entrenched in the institutions of the two countries—especially as hardliners have consolidated control in Tehran—and attempts to re-establish relations in the next few years are unlikely. The Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the nuclear agreement and adopt a policy of “maximum pressure” aimed at isolating Iran diplomatically and economically has made Iran more bellicose, not less. Following the assassination of the Iranian General Qasem Soleimani by the United States in January 2020, the two countries have had a direct military conflict for the first time since the 1980s. Even if U.S. policymakers manage to avoid a full-scale war with Iran and contain its nuclear ambitions, they may still find themselves in a low-level conflict with Tehran that has a regional impact.
Although Iran initially maintained compliance with the nuclear agreement after the United States withdrew, it significantly expanded its program last year. It has increased uranium enrichment far beyond the limits of the agreement, bringing it closer to the level of weapons. The research and development of advanced centrifuges are making progress. Under the restrictions of the nuclear agreement, Iran’s breakthrough time, or the time it takes to produce enough enriched materials to make nuclear weapons, has been shortened to several months instead of one year. Nuclear inspectors no longer obtain the access rights required by the agreement. All these steps have brought another factor of tension to Iran’s relations with the United States and the international community.
It is no longer clear whether the Iranians are as eager to revive the deal as before. Iranian officials return to negotiations in Vienna. Return negotiations to resume the deal after the election of Ebrahim Resi in June 2021. They finally agreed to return to negotiations in late November 2021, but it is unclear whether the Biden Authority will have the political bandwidth to provide the sanctions relief needed to restore the agreement, or whether Iran will agree to the required nuclear rollback. It is almost certain that Israel, which the Biden administration has always cared about, will not support concessions to Iran.
The problem with the United States in the Middle East may not be that it is leaving, but that it has been going the wrong way.
If the negotiations fail, US officials are already discussing "Plan B" with their Israeli counterparts. This strategy will include more economic pressure and possible military options. It is not yet clear how this "back to the future" policy will lead to a new nuclear agreement, especially without the possible international support before the 2015 agreement. Given the escalating tensions between Beijing and Washington, it is hard to imagine that China will sign a new economic pressure on Iran. In fact, after the United States and the United Kingdom decided to sell nuclear submarines to Australia, China recently expressed more sympathy for Iran’s nuclear enrichment rights. Beijing believes that Australia has a proliferation risk. If the nuclear agreement cannot be revitalized, Iran may repeat its response to the Trump administration’s policy of maximum pressure: accelerate military strikes in the region, including attacks on the US military.
If the agreement breaks, it will be more difficult for the United States to reduce its presence in the Middle East and shift its focus elsewhere. The Israelis will of course not put Iran in a secondary position, and they are almost guaranteed to continue the escalation. The "shadow war" between Jerusalem and Iran has greatly expanded: it has surpassed the Syrian theater, where Israel often strikes at targets allied with Iran and enters active maritime confrontation. It also continued its assassination of top Iranian nuclear scientists and its direct attacks on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, including the explosion of Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility at the beginning of diplomacy in Vienna in April 2021. The cyber war between Israel and Iran has even extended to civilian targets.
So far, Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett has avoided public quarrels with Washington on Iran. But although his style may be different from that of former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, his policy does not seem to be significantly different. Bennett has always insisted on Israel's secret military operations against Iran's nuclear program, and talked about the "thousand-and-thousand cuts" strategy against Tehran. Other Israeli leaders have issued public statements reiterating Israel’s right to resist Iran, which is widely understood as Israel’s retention of its military options. Israel is not a treaty ally of the United States, but the United States’ political commitment to Israel’s security is so deep that if a full-scale conflict between Iran and Israel breaks out, it will be difficult for Washington to stand by.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to brew, even if the Palestinian issue is not a priority for the region and Washington. Policymakers may be more willing to improve the economic situation of the Palestinians rather than pressure the Israelis on core issues such as settlement expansion. The violence that broke out in the Gaza Strip in May showed that the United States can work hard behind the scenes to contain the conflict, but it cannot be ignored. The normalization between Israel and the Arab countries is a welcome regional development, but it cannot replace the settlement of actual belligerents.
With all these requirements, the United States will not abandon the Middle East. In fact, it may face a different problem-not that it is leaving, but that it stays in all the wrong ways.
The Biden administration appears to be doubling down on military commitments to appease partners who are still skeptical of its foreign policy trajectory. The sale of weapons to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates proves that Washington still prioritizes its military partnerships in the region. But these efforts, especially when they are not balanced with participation in human security and governance challenges, may contribute to regional conflicts and repression. (The United States currently provides as much military assistance to Egypt as it invests in economic development assistance for the entire region each year.) This is the secret of a permanent crisis, and it will force the United States to take costly measures to curb new forms of extremism and violence.
A better way forward is to use the opportunity of regional rebalancing to reduce military commitments and increase economic and development assistance. The United States needs to refocus its attention and resources on the challenges that affect people’s daily lives. Building the capacity to deal with climate change in a region that is already struggling with weak infrastructure and expanding opportunities for young people are the types of issues that US officials should consider when visiting the Middle East. U.S. support in these areas should be based on work that has already been done but has insufficient resources and display.
At this moment of strategic change, the United States has the opportunity to do things differently-to formulate and implement development and fairness strategies. It can invest in solving the socioeconomic and governance challenges that prevent citizens of the region from leading a better life, rather than large-scale military investments. The United States and its wealthy allies can help partners who want to transform the region from a series of problems to a series of possibilities. Either way, the United States and the Middle East will not part ways-but Washington should seize the opportunity to be part of the solution, not part of the problem.
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